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Abstract      The popularization of microblogging in China represents a new challenge to the 
state’s regime of information control. The speed with which information is diffused in the 
microblogosphere has helped netizens to publicize and express their discontent with the 
negative consequences of economic growth, income inequalities and official corruption. In 
some cases, netizen led initiatives have facilitated the mobilization of online public opinion 
and forced the central government to intervene to redress acts of lower level malfeasance. 
However, despite the growing corpus of such cases, the government has quickly adapted to 
the changing internet ecology and is using the same tools to help it maintain control of 
society by enhancing its claims to legitimacy, circumscribing dissent, identifying malfeasance 
in its agents and using online public opinion to adapt policy and direct propaganda efforts. 
This essay reflects on microblogging in the context of the Chinese internet, and argues that 
successes in breaking scandals and mobilizing opinion against recalcitrant officials should 
not mask the reality that the government is utilizing the microblogosphere to its own 
advantage.    
 
Keywords China; microblogging; Weibo; new and social media; cyber-activism; 
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Introduction 
The corpus of cases where online activism has taken the lead in spreading information and 
mobilizing public opinion about governmental abuses of power, cover-ups and scandals has 
grown rapidly since the emergence and popularization of microblogging in China (Hasid, 
2012a).
1
 With their several hundred million users, Sina, Tencent and other microblog services 
allow netizens to receive and pass along information more efficiently than previous 
technologies, sometimes faster even than China’s vaunted censors can keep up with. 
However, although microblogging represents a new challenge to the state’s regime of 
information control, when there is growing discontent with the negative consequences of 
rapid economic growth, corruption and income inequalities (O’Brien, 2008), the government 
is also using it in multiple ways to maintain control of society. This essay reflects on 
microblogging in the context of the Chinese internet, at a time when China scholars are 
coming to term with the ramifications of the growth of China’s internet population and the 
emergence of social media. The uses and effects of social media in China represent an 
important case for the theoretical literature, both in terms of the on-going debate between 
cyber-realists and utopians, and specifically in terms of microblogging, where the unusual 
development of the Chinese context problematizes the easy transposition of arguments.  
 
Chinese internet research 
Similar to other contexts, claims about the political effects of the internet in China range from 
the cyber-realist (‘authoritarian states harness the internet to propagate control and maintain 
power’) to the cyber-utopian (‘the internet will bring about pluralisation and liberalization 
and tip the state-society balance in favour of society’). To its credit, scholarly research on 
China has long acknowledged the potential for the state to use the internet for its own ends, 
even while raising the likelihood of new challenges to its power (e.g. Chase and Mulvenon, 
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2003; Harwit and Clark, 2001; Hughes, 2000; Taubman, 1998). On the other hand, 
commentary in popular outlets has at times been euphoric, such as Nicholas Kristof’s (2005) 
‘Death by a Thousand Blogs’ op-ed in the New York Times, which concluded that ‘the 
Chinese leadership itself is digging the Communist Party’s grave, by giving the Chinese 
people broadband’ (for a critique of what he calls ‘rosy assessments’ in the scholarly 
literature on China, see Leibold, 2011). In the intervening years however, the state has been 
proven adept at controlling and channelling online activities, despite the rapid growth of the 
internet population and the popularization of social media. As the field of Chinese internet 
studies has evolved, scholars have directed their attention to the multifarious interactions 
between state, society and technology and the many contextual and agent-based factors that 
affect the outcome of these interactions (Chase and Mulvenon, 2002; Damm and Thomas, 
2006; Hughes and Wacker, 2003; Qiu, 2009; Shen and Breslin, 2010; Tai, 2006). Scholars 
may still argue that the internet is bringing positive changes to state-society relations, but 
they talk circumspectly about enhanced prospects for political participation, the growth of a 
nascent public sphere and mechanisms for potentially increasing government accountability 
(Herold and Marolt, 2011; Lagerkvist, 2011; Liu, 2010; Sun, 2010; Yang, 2003, 2009; Zhang 
and Zheng, 2009; Zheng, 2007; Zheng and Wu, 2005; Yuan, 2010; Zhou, 2006). Rather than 
a duel between state and civil/online society, scholars emphasize tensions between higher and 
lower level authorities within the state hierarchy, the roles of entrepreneurial and increasingly 
influential actors in the media, business and cultural elites, and their interactions with an 
astonishingly large (and growing) number of netizens (Herold and Marolt, 2011; Yang, 2009). 
The emphasis on the ‘increasingly complex relationship between state and society and the 
contentious issues that have marked this relationship’ (Rosen, 2010: 515) reflects broader 
work on the implicit negotiations and compromises going on between state and society actors 
in other arenas (Hsu, 2010; O’Brien and Li, 2006; Saich, 2000). 
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Many of the boundaries and rules in Chinese cyberspace are still being negotiated and 
this context of ad hoc legal structures and unsettled cultural norms presents openings for 
Chinese netizens to express themselves relatively freely, despite restrictions (Chase and 
Mulvenon, 2002; Kalathil and Boas, 2003). Chinese cyberspace is a cacophony of voices, 
many of them critical, resentful or giving vent to material and other grievances suffered at the 
hands of the rich and powerful, corrupt officials, or any number of other problems caused by 
dramatic socio-economic changes (Yang, 2009). There are few calls for radical political 
change, but the online embodiment of the ‘quotidian world of resistance and response’ (O’ 
Brien and Stern, 2008: 24) is commonplace. These manifestations of discontent reflect 
changes in the post-Tiananmen era where the grounds for regime legitimacy changed to 
observable performance, encompassing both the material (standard of living, upward mobility) 
and the spiritual (patriotism, China’s global status) (Rosen, 2010: 512). And just as the 
number of ‘collective incidents’ (riots, strikes, road blocks etc.) has increased exponentially 
in recent years (Cai, 2010), so dissatisfaction with government performance or the 
consequences of government policy is prevalent online, in both explicit and oblique forms 
(King et al., 2012; Tang and Bhattacharya, 2011). 
One of the most useful accounts of activism on the Chinese internet is Yang (2009).  
Yang argues that ‘online activism derives its forms and dynamics from a broad spectrum of 
converging and contending forces’ (2009: 1) conceptualized as a ‘multi-interactionism model’ 
in which the state, cultures of contention, the market, civil society and trans-nationalization 
all feed into, and are affected by, online activism. Conceiving online activism as both a 
reflection and reflector of the complexity and multidimensionality of contemporary Chinese 
society is an important advance. It reminds us that the full range of actors and the same 
activities and behaviours that occur in the physical world are also present online and that an 
online/offline dichotomy is artificial and simplistic, as many events are constituted by ‘deeply 
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intertwined real and virtual aspects’ (Jiang, 2010a: 5). Yang (2009) chronicles dozens of 
cases of online dissent and protest, with struggles for recognition and belonging, against 
oppression and exploitation with protagonists drawn from every sector of Chinese society. 
However, these incidents are almost always restricted to a single issue and quickly peter out 
after government intervention in successful cases, or following indifference or repression in 
others. Yang’s findings are consistent with observations of state behaviour (tolerance of 
protest as long as it is specific, localized and does contain a threat of collective action) and 
common stereotypes about mass attitudes (there are many critics of the government but the 
majority of people do not want radical changes in society). More recent Weibo cases show 
the same dynamics—success in publicizing localized examples of malfeasance, corruption or 
scandals (Hasid, 2012a), but rapid and strong censorship and counter-propaganda efforts 
where cases show potential for collective action (King et al., 2012). Yet, even in those cases 
where Weibo mobilizes public opinion to induce a government response, it is important to 
recognize that online public opinion is as a capricious accountability mechanism, and the vast 
majority of injustices, power abuses and grievances don’t gain publicity or support. What 
determines whether or not a case gains traction is an open question in China. Analyzing the 
success and failure of offline protest acts, Cai (2010) finds that large numbers of protesters 
mobilizing in reaction to egregious malfeasance by local actors jeopardizing the state’s 
legitimacy are the most likely to prompt successful interventions. Similar dynamics are 
evident in the Weibo cases where salacious or egregious scandals, particularly those dealing 
with corruption and privilege, which focus anger on specific individual officials are most 
likely to gain the attention of important information brokers (e.g. journalists with a large 
number of followers). The major problem with Weibo events is their sporadic, transient and 
unsustainable nature (Jiang 2010a), a problem that is not peculiar to the Chinese context 
(Christensen, 2011; Morozov, 2011: 191).  
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Microblogging in China 
At time of writing, there are more than 500 million internet users, 100 million bloggers and 
300 million microbloggers in China (Chan, 2011; Hasid, 2012a). Apart from the sheer size of 
these numbers, several things stand out about China’s internet population. First, the level of 
internet penetration still has room to grow. Second, the proportion of netizens who access the 
mobile internet has increased rapidly, reducing inequalities in access (Qiu, 2009). Third, 
Chinese netizens are relatively young (Liu, 2010), with an average age of 28 years, much 
younger than their American counterparts (40 years old),
2
 which scholars have noted as a 
possible explanation for the ‘wildness’ evident on the Chinese internet (Maroldt, 2011). 
Finally, Chinese netizens are exceptionally social and active, voraciously consuming and 
producing online information (Yang, 2009).
3
 Although the familiar 
Facebook/Twitter/YouTube triumvirate that dominates the social media ecology globally 
does not pertain in China (none have been available behind the firewall since mid-2009), 
Chinese netizens have an abundance of competing local services to choose from, most of 
them specially tailored for the local market. Applying Min Jiang’s (2010b) typology, these 
services are ‘government-regulated commercial spaces,’ i.e. privately owned platforms that 
are subject to government regulation, ‘including elaborate requirements for content 
censorship and user surveillance.’ Among them, the Tencent-owned QQ brand draws 
together multiple platforms from instant messaging to gaming and boasts several hundred 
million users.
4
 The social network site Renren (formerly known as Xiaonei),
5
 which is often 
described as China’s Facebook, raised several hundred million dollars with its public listing 
on the New York Stock Exchange in May 2011. One consequence of the unusual 
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proliferation of companies and platforms in China’s social media landscape is the 
differentiation of user profiles for different services. For example, while Twitter’s small band 
of firewall-jumping users represents the non-conformist intellectual elite, the QQ platform 
serves the much greater number of lower income netizens accessing the mobile internet 
(Sullivan, 2012). 
             Despite having started life as a Twitter clone, Sina Weibo has added a number of 
features such as message threading and the ability to comment directly on other users’ posts. 
Chinese microblogs combine elements of bulletin board systems (BBS) and blogs, both of 
which have been extremely popular in China (Mackinnon, 2008).  Beijing University media 
scholar, Hu Yong, notes that this suits Chinese netizens, ‘who like to chat in groups […and 
explains…] why you see a lot of bickering and fighting on Weibo’ (cited in Jing, 2011). 
Unlike in English, where the 140 character limit demands terseness, using Chinese characters 
allows users to write nuanced messages and include other contributors’ thoughts in their own 
messages making it easier to follow and participate in online conversations. As the artist-
activist Ai Weiwei notes, ‘in the Chinese language, 140 characters is a novella’ (cited in 
Ambrozy, 2011: 241). 
The earliest Chinese microblogs (TaoTao, Jiwai, Zuosa and Fanfou) were established 
in 2007, but did not have their breakthrough moment until February 2009. When an illegal 
fireworks display caused a fire in a building next to the new headquarters of the state 
television system, official news outlets responded with their usual caution, to be outflanked 
by witnesses on the streets of Beijing who broke the story on their microblogs (Ramzy, 2011). 
This success for citizen journalism showed that information could be accessed more reliably 
than via state media channels, where coverage is often compromised by the government’s 
sensitivities. During events like the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak in 
2003, natural disasters like the Wenchuan earthquake in 2008 and numerous food security 
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scandals, crucial information has been withheld from citizens. Blogs and other online 
communications have taken on greater importance and credibility than in countries with freer 
media systems (Ambrozy, 2011: xxvi; Hung, 2006; Lagerkvist, 2005; Wang, 2010). Twitter 
and the local clones were allowed to operate without any special restrictions until the summer 
of 2009 when the heightened sensitivities that accompanied the twentieth anniversary of the 
Tiananmen Square incident were soon followed by disturbances in Xinjiang that killed nearly 
200 people. These ethnic riots were apparently triggered by an article posted on an internet 
forum (Morozov, 2011: 259). The central government claimed that the riots had been inspired 
by Uighur separatists abroad through the conduit of online forums, and used this alleged 
threat to deny internet access to the entire Xinjiang province for several months. Since the 
state controls the technological infrastructure, (private internet companies effectively rent 
cyberspace from the government) it is able to deny internet access to restive regions 
(Reporters Without Borders, 2011). The government acted quickly to block US-based 
internet services like Facebook and Twitter, and shut down the local microblogging services 
that had been unable to control information flows.  
Despite this setback, microblogging had proven sufficiently popular that after the 
crackdown other companies were willing to enter the vacuum with assurances to the 
government about keeping information flows under control. First to enter the market was the 
search and news portal Sina.com, which set about building the platform by inducing 
entertainers, CEOs and sports stars to sign up with exclusive financial contracts (Jing, 2011). 
Use of Weibo reflects trends in the broader Chinese internet, which is dominated by 
entertainment (Guo, 2005). The most popular daily trends on Sina Weibo
6
 and the most 
popular Weibo users, judged by their number of followers, is consistent with Twitter in the 
US (Hargittai and Litt, 2011). That said, well known academics, journalists and prominent 
business people have also attracted substantial followings. Sina Weibo has clearly learned 
 9 
 
from the earlier experiences of Twitter and Fanfou, implementing comprehensive and 
proactive censorship. To track and block content, Weibo employs thousands of censors and 
uses sophisticated software to monitor ‘sensitive words.’7 In order to retain the trust invested 
in it by the government, and fulfil its legal obligation to observe ‘self-discipline’ (Mackinnon, 
2011: 37-8), Sina Weibo implements multiple levels of censorship. Attempting to evade this 
control, many Chinese netizens use clever methods to elude the suppression or 
‘harmonization’ of their more, or less, subversive messages,8 for example posting images 
instead of more easily censored text, or using the ‘grass-mud-horse lexicon.’ 9  There is 
scattered evidence, and much optimistic commentary, that the speed of and volume of Weibo 
is challenging the state’s information control regime 
 
Challenges to the state’s information order  
Information (facts, frames, histories, discourses, ideas, narratives) is a key component in the 
‘soft power’ that authoritarian governments leverage in order to maintain their claims to 
legitimacy and delegitimize their opponents. Authoritarian regimes select and control access 
to the information that citizens are exposed to and interpret ‘the facts’ for them. Media and 
education systems are especially useful for this purpose, reinforced by multiple forms of 
propaganda and censorship. The centrality of the Ministry of Information and the lengths that 
the state has gone to in order to regulate information flows on the Chinese internet is 
evidence of the premium that the government places on controlling the information that 
netizens are exposed to and can pass along to their friends (Kalathil and Boas, 2003). 
However, information control has become harder in China, both with the increasing 
accessibility of internet access, and popularization of the citizen’s ‘right to know’ (Chan and 
Bi, 2009). The right to know, particularly about the social consequences of rapid economic 
growth, resonates with citizens who observe growing economic disparities, the spread of 
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privilege and corruption, and the negative externalities of industrialization, combined with 
suspicion and scepticism about the motives and abilities of the government to deal with these 
problems. Investigative journalism addressing social injustices and giving the marginalized a 
voice is popular, commercially viable, and in-keeping with interpretations of Jiang Zemin’s 
‘three represents’ and the current leadership’s ‘harmonious society’ doctrine (Chan and Bi, 
2009: 7). Commercial media outlets are engaged in a process of implicit negotiation with the 
government, pushing the boundaries of what it is permissible to report (Huang, 2007), 
sometimes in response to stories broken in the blog- and micro-blogospheres (Hasid, 2012b; 
Xin, 2010). Rosen (2010) argues that the sum of these developments is that they have 
effectively eliminated the state’s monopoly on information.  
Zhang (2011) argues that, ‘in the olden days, Chinese waited for the benevolent 
official of myth and fiction to come and deliver justice: Today people wait for microblogs to 
apply pressure, administering some semblance of justice.’ Hu Yong (2011) redefines the 
notion of the ‘surrounding gaze,’ which originally referred to the callous indifference of 
crowds at public spectacles, to describe a situation where everyone is now a witness to the 
state and its agents’ actions. These claims are supported by numerous examples of where 
online, citizen-led journalism has generated political pressure via online public opinion. 
Zhang (2011) cites the case of Liao Weiming, Vice President of Jiangxi University of 
Finance and Economics who ran down a group of students, killing two, before driving off 
while intoxicated. This example of privilege and abuse resonated with netizens, whose 
widespread outrage induced the Nanchang City government to intercede. In a similar case, 
online public opinion was instrumental in the arrest and conviction of Li Qiming, who 
implied after a fatal hit and run accident that justice would not be served due to his privileged 
status as son of the deputy director of the local security bureau. His contemptuous attitude of 
was encapsulated in the phrase, ‘Li Gang is my dad’, which became a rallying point for 
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netizens (Wines, 2010). The death and aftermath of Qian Yunhui, an elected village head in 
Zhejiang, highlighted a different type of abuse of power. Qian, who had relentlessly 
petitioned the local government for better compensation for villagers from a nearby power 
plant, was run down by a truck shortly before he was due to stand for re-election. The 
convenient timing and suspicious nature of the accident focused public attention on the 
election, in which villagers were emboldened to vote for Qian’s cousin.10  Another high 
profile case involved a family in Yihuang, after three members burned themselves to protest 
the demolition of their home. While the local government reported it as an accident, two 
family members prepared to travel to Beijing in order to petition the central government. 
Agents of the local government prevented them from taking their flight, but trapped in an 
airport restroom they connected with Phoenix Weekly journalist Deng Fei who broadcast the 
standoff live on his Weibo. The attention this generated in the microblogosphere quickly led 
to intervention by the (higher level) Municipal government and later, conciliatory statements 
by Su Rong, the highest ranking Communist Party official in Jiangxi Province.
11
 Ying Chan 
(2011) argues that ‘given how information from Yihuang was spread, this story signalled a 
landmark moment in contemporary Chinese media with the emergence of microblogs.’ 
Despite this apparent success for citizen journalism, the outcome in this, and other, cases was 
highly circumscribed. People vented their anger, malfeasant agents were identified and 
removed and cases were quickly forgotten. Systemic problems that allow corruption and 
other societal ills to flourish on a national scale were not addressed, and the party was able to 
propagate its image as benevolent protector of the nation let down by the wrongdoings of its 
representatives. This is one outcome among many that lends support to Morozov’s claim that 
‘the web can actually strengthen rather than undermine authoritarian regimes’ (2011: 28).  
 
State adaptation: Using Weibo to maintain control 
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China scholars, policymakers in Washington and others have spent much energy considering 
the contradiction of Beijing’s genuine commitment to developing the internet and almost 
compulsive attempts to control it (Mackinnon, 2011: 37). Although this attitude may appear 
schizophrenic, it is consistent with the system of ‘consultative Leninism’ that the party has 
adopted since the death of Deng Xioaping (Tsang, 2009), in which maintaining power is 
paramount. Among the instruments used to achieve this goal, the party has enhanced its 
capacity to elicit, respond to and direct public opinion and shown flexibility in governance 
reform to pre-empt widespread demands for greater liberalization. These and other 
adaptations are clearly evident in the state’s use of the internet, which Chinese internet expert 
Rebecca Mackinnon, drawing on the work of He and Warren (2011), characterizes as a 
system of ‘networked authoritarianism’ (2011).  
 The central government is faced with a serious principal-agent problem in which 
lower level authorities have substantial autonomy in their implementation of state policies. In 
the same way that O’Brien and Li (2006) show how ‘rightful resistance’ can signal problems 
in the principal-agent relationship, online discontent alerts the central government to cases of 
local malfeasance, civil unrest and mass opinions (Verran, 2009). In the cases noted above, 
online public opinion alerted the central government of abuses of power which acted to reign 
in its principals and send a signal to other would-be transgressors. At the same time, the 
government showed itself willing to listen to and act ‘on behalf of the people’, giving the 
facade of responsiveness while neutralizing any urge to join a movement calling for more 
systemic change. King et al.’s (2012) systematic analysis of censorship of millions of social 
media messages similarly demonstrates that the government is content for netizens to voice 
their grievances, but aggressively censors anything that could lead to broader mobilization or 
challenges to state legitimacy. One example is the experience of independent candidates 
standing for election to National People's Representatives Congress, the lowest branch of 
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China’s multi-tier legislature with 30000 members. Ostensibly open elections are held every 
five years, but these exercises are generally choreographed with carefully Party-selected 
candidates. In 2011, over 100 independent candidates declared their intention to run, with the 
vast majority running their ‘campaigns’ via Weibo. Independent candidates running online 
campaigns did not fare well; in most cases they did not make the ballot, being ruled out on 
technicalities or made-up rules, harassed, threatened or arrested (Mackinnon, 2011). 
At any time, millions of messages are being sent around Weibo, a corpus of opinions 
that represents a de facto polling system that the state uses as a feedback mechanism to adapt 
its policies, inform official media or identify and neutralize potential threats. Needless to say, 
promoting one’s opinions online does not come with a guarantee of individual rights and 
freedoms: netizens can be, and are, arrested for what they say online. The detention of online 
activists (and charging them with ‘inciting subversion of state power’) is one way that 
authorities restrict online criticism to specific complaints, which keeps online public opinion 
divided and compartmentalized (Mackinnon, 2008: 34). King et al. (2012) find that 
‘mobilization issues’ are strongly censored, consistent with the fear that all authoritarian 
regimes have of like-minded people coalescing in mind or body. The Chinese government is 
rightly worried by the possibility of discontents from different areas and socio-economic 
sectors coming together to form a cross-region, cross-class coalition that could challenge the 
party’s stability mantra if not the regime itself. Hypothetical ‘collapse’ scenarios are 
frequently driven by some combination of laid-off workers, dispossessed homeowners, 
unemployed graduates, hungry farmers, ethnic and religious minorities discovering that they 
share grievances (e.g. Shirk, 2008: 35-78). Keeping different groups in ignorance of one 
another (and thus unaware of their collective power) is of utmost importance and, as periods 
of unrest in Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia have demonstrated, if the perceived threat to 
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stability is sufficiently strong, the government can exercise its control of the technological 
infrastructure to deny or severely limit access to the internet.  
Since the state recognizes the value of the internet to its continued economic 
modernization (Mackinnnon, 2011), and no doubt understands the value of a venue in which 
a large proportion of the population are kept entertained, actively setting the agenda rather 
than responding to it with draconian suspensions of service is preferable. With its influence 
on ostensibly private internet companies, pro-active censorship regime and strong guidance to 
online media, Chinese cyberspace provides abundant evidence of what Morozov (2011) calls 
the ‘spinternet’. Like many authoritarian regimes, the CCP has made effective use of the 
internet for propaganda purposes. This is particularly evident in the proliferation of popular 
nationalism online (Shen and Breslin, 2009), patriotism having long-since replaced 
Communism as the Party’s unifying and guiding ideology (Tsang, 2009). Since 2004 national 
and local governments and institutions have made use of paid commentators to guide online 
opinion. The use of ‘50 cent’ commentators (a derogatory term alluding to the alleged price 
paid for their services) has expanded as the internet population and venues for discussion 
online have increased. King et al. (2012) estimate that the central government alone employs 
between 250,000 and 300,000 commentators to manipulate online discussion. In addition, 
government institutions and officials have developed an extensive web presence to 
communicate directly with netizens. For instance, official surveys report that by December 
2011 there were 50561 verified government agency accounts across four major microblog 
platforms, of which 32358 were associated with party organs (E-Government Research 
Center, 2012). Although Hasid (2012a) argues that some official organs welcome public 
participation and oversight, he also notes that the majority of official Weibo accounts are 
associated with various organs of the public security system.   
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Conclusion 
Despite the elevated expectations that social media have engendered worldwide, the potential 
for microblogs to affect political behaviour and political change in China is constrained by 
conditions online and offline. Dissent and mobilization remain bound by censorship and 
control, and the objectives of its participants are necessarily circumscribed. The 
government’s embrace and control of the information revolution continues to serve it well 
and it continues to keep the lid on the mobilization of either large-scale, cross-cutting protests 
or a viable opposition movement. Although some scholars argue that ‘political participation 
has taken a big step forward because of microblogging’ (Xiao quoted in Richburg, 2011), 
there is insufficient empirical evidence to support the view that microblogging holds new and 
qualitatively distinct potential for political behaviour and political change in China. Mass 
movements in the physical world are facilitated by communications between people, and 
social media like Weibo support this, but communication does not equal mobilization. Rather 
than reporting ‘trace data’ that support the author’s view about the effects of social media, we 
require a systematic analysis of a large number of cases, without selecting on the outcome, so 
that we have a better idea about the conditions under which Weibo ‘campaigns’ gain traction 
(or fail to). A larger number of cases would also enable us to better infer the conditions in 
which online acts lead to mobilization offline (as exemplified by Cai, 2011 in the case of 
offline protest acts). Furthermore, as Jiang (2010a) and others have argued, it is increasingly 
difficult, indeed artificial, to separate the uses and effects of social media from other forms of 
online and offline means of communication. For all the exuberant commentary surrounding 
social media use during the Arab Spring, more careful analysis suggests that traditional media 
and face-to-face communications were equally, if not more, influential (Calhoun, 2011). Prior 
research on social movements in China similarly demonstrates that physical world social ties 
are crucial (O’Brien and Li, 2006; Shi and Cai, 2006), even where campaigns have a 
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significant online component (Sullivan and Xie, 2009). As the Weibo user base continues to 
grow and becomes increasingly mobile and integrated into everyday lives, the need for more 
holistic studies that treat social media as one component of the communications repertoire 
increases (cf. Farrell, 2011). 
Information transmitted by Weibo can constitute an accountability mechanism in the 
form of online public opinion, but is capricious and unreliable. Virtual mob justice is a 
clumsy mechanism for advancing government accountability. Furthermore, rather than a 
‘carnivalesque riot’ (Herold, 2011) human flesh searches raise the spectre of Cultural 
Revolution-era vigilantism, albeit not systematically directed by state ideology (Mackinnon, 
2009). In cases where netizens have acted against recalcitrant citizens (rather than 
government agents), authorities have usually declined to become involved (Herold, 2008), 
indicating tacit acceptance of a form of ‘justice’ that can result in severe harassment and 
physical world consequences for the targets of such actions. Governments in China 
sometimes respond to their agents’ misdemeanours more efficaciously when they witness 
rapidly assembling and riotous netizens, but they are also using information culled from 
Weibo to identify and neutralize the same ‘threatening’ behaviour. Netizens will likely 
continue to use Weibo to publicize localized incidences of low level malfeasance, and the 
central government may allow them to proceed and may sometimes intervene. But wherever 
a Weibo event holds potential to grow beyond the parameters of localized discontent, the 
state will implement its censorship and propaganda regime, reinforced by control of 
technological infrastructure, legal and political leverage over internet companies and by 
marshalling physical world public security apparatus. Ultimately, while microblogs may 
speed up the diffusion of information, there is little reason, as yet, to believe that ‘faster is 
different’ (Tufecki, 2011).  The implications of Weibo may thus not be in isolated events that 
generate small scale interventions, but in a longer term process by which netizens become 
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accustomed to greater transparency, political participation and demand more systematic 
mechanisms for accountability, as suggested by Tai (2006) and others.  
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